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Abstract
We highlight the role of commuting cost, location and housing market in
crime decision. By assuming that all crimes are committed in the central busi-
ness district and that criminals create both positive and negative externalities
to each other, we ﬁnd that high wages or large levels of police resources are a
natural way to reduce crime. We also ﬁnd that bigger cities experience higher
levels of crime because of the ﬁercer competition in the housing market. Fi-
nally, we show that reducing commuting costs can also reduce crime because
the resulting decrease in housing prices is lower for workers than for criminals.
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11 Introduction
It is well documented that there are more crime in big than in small cities
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). For example, the rate of violent crime in cities
with more than 250,000 population is 346 per 100,000 inhabitants whereas in
cities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, the rate of violent crime is just 176 per
100,000 (Glaeser, 1998). Similar ﬁgures can be found for property crimes or
other less violent crimes. It is also well documented that, within cities, crime
is highly concentrated in a limited number of areas. For instance, South and
C r o w d e r( 1 9 9 7 ,T a b l e2 )h a v es h o w nt h a tU . S .c e n t r a lc i t i e sh a v eh i g h e rc r i m e
and unemployment rates, higher population densities and larger relative black
populations than their corresponding suburban rings.
To our knowledge, three types of theoretical models have integrated space
a n dl o c a t i o ni nc r i m eb e h a v i o r .F i r s t ,social interaction models that state that
individual behavior depends not only on the individual incentives but also on
the behavior of the peers and the neighbors are a natural way to explain the
concentration of crime by area. An individual is more likely to commit crime
if his or her peers commit than if they do not commit crime (Glaeser et al.,
1996; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004; Ballester et al., 2004; Calvó-Armengol
et al., 2005). This explanation is backed up by several empirical studies that
show that indeed neighbors matter in explaining crime behaviors. Case and
Katz (1991), using the 1989 NBER survey of young living in low-income, inner-
city Boston neighborhoods, found that residence in a neighborhood in which
many other youths are involved in crime is associated with an increase in an
individual’s probability of committing crime. Exploiting a natural experience
(i.e. the Moving to Opportunity experiment that has assigned a total of 614
families living in high-poverty Baltimore neighborhoods into richer neighbor-
hoods), Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005) found that the behavior or
characteristics of neighbors strongly inﬂuence juvenile criminal activity. Also,
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005) test whether the position and the centrality of
each delinquent in a network of teenager friends has an impact on crime eﬀort.
They show that, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and
unobservable network speciﬁc factors, the individual’s position in a network is
a key determinant of his/her level of criminal activity.
Second, Freeman et al. (1996) provide a theoretical model that explains
why criminals are concentrated in some areas of the city (ghettos) and why they
tend to commit crimes in their own local areas and not in rich neighborhoods.
Their explanation is based on the fact that, when criminals are numerous
2in an area, the probability to be caught is low so that criminals create a
positive externality for each other. In this context, criminals concentrate their
eﬀort in (poor) neighborhoods where the probability to be caught is small. This
explanation has also strong empirical support. See e.g. O’Sullivan (2000).
Finally, Verdier and Zenou (2004) show that prejudices and distance to
jobs (legal activities) can explain crime activities, especially among blacks. If
everybody believes that blacks are more criminal than whites -even if there is
no basis for this- then blacks are oﬀered lower wages and, as a result, locate
further away from jobs. Distant residence increases even more the black-white
wage gap because of more tiredness and higher commuting costs. Blacks have
thus a lower opportunity cost of committing crime and become indeed more
criminal than whites. Using 206 census tracts in city of Atlanta and Dekalb
county and a state-of-the-art job accessibility measure, Ihlanfeldt (2001, 2002)
demonstrates that modest improvements in the job accessibility of male youth,
in particular blacks, cause marked reductions in crime, especially within cat-
egory of drug-abuse violations. He found an elasticity of 0.361, which implies
that 20 additional jobs will decrease the neighborhood’s density of drug crime
by 3.61%.1
In this paper, we propose an alternative but complementary explanation
of the link between crime and location by highlighting the role of the hous-
ing market. In our model, jobs and crime are localized since all crimes are
assumed to be committed in the Central Business District (CBD) where all
jobs are located. This implies that all individuals commute to the CBD either
to commit crime or to work (the two activities are mutually exclusive). As a
result, the decision to commit crime depends on the commuting cost, the hous-
ing price, but also on the number of criminals in the city. Indeed, there are
two types of externalities that criminals create for each other: a negative one
since the higher the number of criminals the lower is the return per criminal
(the more that other thieves operate in the CBD, the less that remains for a
particular thief) but the lower is the probability to be caught (holding police
resources constant, the greater the number of criminals operating in the CBD,
the smaller the chance that any one will be caught).2
We ﬁrst characterize the diﬀerent equilibria. Not surprisingly, we found
1For a more detailed survey on the spatial aspects of crime, see Zenou (2003).
2These two externalities are also present in Freeman et al. (1996). However, their focus
is totally diﬀerent since they compare two diﬀerent neighborhoods in which the housing
market is absent whereas here we focus on one neighborhood by highlighting the role of the
housing market in the crime decision.
3that if the wage is large enough, then there is no crime in this city whereas if
it is small enough, then everybody has the incentive of becoming a criminal.
However, for intermediate values of the wage, there is some positive level of
crime in the city and the criminals live far away from jobs while the workers
reside close to the CBD. We then focus on this last regime and we show that in
bigger cities there is more crime and increasing police resources reduces crime.
We also show that, when the access to the CBD becomes more diﬃcult, i.e. the
commuting cost increases, housing prices rise but this increase is even more
pronounced for workers than for criminals because the former live closer to
jobs than the latter. Consequently, since workers lose relatively more than
criminals, an increase in commuting costs implies that it becomes less costly
to be a criminal, and, as a result, the number of criminals in the city increases.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a city that is represented by a line whose origin is taken to be zero.
The Central Business District (CBD hereafter) where all jobs and shops are
located is precisely at zero. Any location outside the CBD is denoted by x,
w h i c hi si nf a c tt h ed i s t a n c et ot h eC B D .L a n d l o r d sa r ea b s e n ta n dt h ec i t yi s
closed.
There are two types of individuals: workers and criminals and there is a
continuum of each type (for simplicity the density of individuals at each loca-
tion is equal to 1). The total mass of individuals in the city is N. We assume
that workers and criminals are risk neutral. Each individual simultaneously
chooses to locate in the city and to work or commit crime. The two activities
(working and committing crime) are mutually exclusive so that a criminal can-
not work and a worker cannot be a criminal. There are n criminals and thus
N −n workers residing in the city. As a result, the size of the city is given by
N.I nt h i sm o d e l ,N is given whereas n will be determined in equilibrium.
The crime is localized in that all crimes are committed in the CBD. So,
the type of crime we have in mind is theft (e.g. shop lifting), robbery (not
properties but rather shops), assault, damage/vandalism ... The idea is that a
criminal living in x commutes to the CBD to commit a crime. Let us denote
by t the commuting cost per unit of distance. A worker (thus not a criminal)
living in x who commutes every day to work bears a commuting cost equals
to tx (we have thus normalized to 1 the number of return trips that a worker
do; for example if the unit is the week, then this normalization corresponds
4to ﬁve return trips every week). A criminal, who does not work, goes to the
CBD only to commit crime (and may shop at the same time). Let us denote
by 0 <α<1 the fraction of commuting that is devoted to criminal activities
so that a criminal residing in x has a commuting cost that amounts to αtx.
This implies that α is the (exogenous) percentage of crime that each criminal
commit. For example, α =1 /5 means that the criminals make only one ﬁfth
as many CBD trips as the workers. If the unit is the week, this means the
criminal goes once a week to the CBD and thus commit one crime per week.
Observe that we assume that 0 <α<1, which means that, when someone
decide to be a criminal, he always go to the CBD to commit a crime (if α is
very small, then they go rarely to the CBD and thus seldom commit a crime)
and criminals always commute less than workers (i.e. nobody is committing
a crime everyday). Observe also that α is exogenous and assumed to be the
same for all criminals. Obviously α could be a choice variable and could diﬀer
for individuals with diﬀerent locations. For simplicity and tractability, we keep
α as exogenous.
The fact that crime is localized in the CBD (individuals do not commit
crime at their own location) has two main consequences. First, the booty each
criminal obtains depends on the number of criminals residing in the city and
the number of crime committed. Indeed, the ﬁrst eﬀect is because, when there
are more criminals operating in the CBD, the less that remains for a particular
criminal (think for example of thieves where more thieves implies that there
is less to steal for a particular thief) so that the return per criminal must
eventually fall. As a result, the booty per criminal b(n,α) is a decreasing
function of n and obviously an increasing function of α (the more a criminal











so that the booty decreases at a decreasing rate.
Second, the probability of arrest is a function of the police resources, the
number of criminals in the city and the number of crime committed.I f m
denotes the police resources in the city, then the probability of arrest for a










5Indeed, the more police resources is allocated to the city, the higher is the
probability to arrest a criminal. However, the higher is the number of criminals
in the city, the lower is this probability (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 1977,
for empirical evidence on this negative relationship). Finally, the higher the
n u m b e ro fc r i m ec o m m i t t e d ,t h eh i g h e ri st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt ob ec a u g h t . W e




which means that this probability increases at an increasing rate.
Let us describe the behavior of workers. Each worker consumes one unit of
land and a composite good z,a n dh i su t i l i t yi sg i v e nb yV NC = z.M o r e o v e r ,
he earns a wage w but commutes to the CBD and pays a (land) rent equals to
R(x) when living at x. His budget constraint is thus given by:
z = w − tx − R(x)
As a result, the utility of a worker located at x is equal to:
V
NC = w − tx − R(x) (1)
Similarly, the utility of a criminal located at x is given by:
V
C =[ 1− p(m,n,α)][b(n,α) − αtx − R(x)] (2)
In (2), one can see that if a criminal is caught, then he goes to jail and loses his
booty but of course does not pay anymore commuting costs and a land rent.
We are now able to write the bid rents of workers and criminals in the city3.
For workers, using (1), we have:
Ψ
NC(x,V
NC)=w − tx − V
NC (3)
whereas, for criminals, using (2), we have:
Ψ
C(x,V




3The bid rent is a standard concept in urban economics. It indicates the maximum land
rent that each individual located at a distance x from the CBD is ready to pay in order to
achieve his utility level.
63 Choosing location and crime/work
As stated above, individuals choose simultaneously location and crime/work.
Therefore, we ﬁrst solve the residential equilibrium (i.e. we determine the exact
location of all individuals in the city, their land rents and utilities) treating n
the number of criminals as a parameter. We then focus on crime and work
decisions by assuming that the city structure corresponds to that unique urban
conﬁguration.
3.1 Choosing location: the land-use urban equilibrium
For a given choice of occupational activity (crime or work), each individual
chooses the location in the city that maximizes his utility subject to the cor-
responding budget constraint.
Let us now introduce the deﬁnition of a residential equilibrium. In fact,
in equilibrium, three diﬀerent regimes can arise depending on the number of
criminals n in the city: there is either ac r i m e - f r e er e g i m e(n =0 ,r e g i m e1 ) ,
a partial-crime regime (0 <n<N,r e g i m e2 )o ratotal-crime regime (n = N,
regime 3). Let us now present the deﬁnitions and characterizations of the
unique urban equilibrium in each one of the diﬀerent regimes.4 For simplicity,
the land rent outside the city is normalized to zero.
Deﬁnition 1 A residential equilibrium with no crime ( r e g i m e1 )i sav e c t o r
(R1(x),VNC















Equation (5) says that (absentee) landlords allocate land to the highest bids
in the city. Equation (6) reﬂects the equilibrium conditions in the land market
that ensure that, at the city fringe, the land rent is equal to the opportunity
cost of land outside the city (i.e. zero). Solving (5)-(6) yields:
V
NC






−tx + tN for 0 ≤ x ≤ N
0 for x>N
(8)
4All variables with subscript 1,2 or 3 refer to regime 1,2,3 respectively.
7Deﬁnition 2 A residential equilibrium with total crime ( r e g i m e3 )i sav e c -
tor (R3(x),VC















The interpretation of (9) and (10) are exactly the same as (5) and (6).
Solving (9) and (10), we obtain:5
V
C






−αtx + αtN for 0 ≤ x ≤ N
0 for x>N
(12)
Finally, to deﬁne the regime where both criminals and workers co-exist in
the same city, we ﬁrst need the following result.
Proposition 1 In regime 2, the workers reside close to the CBD whereas the
criminals live at the outskirts of the city.
Proof. It is easy to see that the bid rents (3) and (4) are both linear and
decreasing in x. Moreover, since the slope of the bid rent ΨNC(.) is higher than
the one of ΨC(.), then the workers bid away the criminals to the periphery.
This result is very intuitive. Indeed, since it is more costly for the workers
to be far away from the CBD, they will have steeper bid rents and thus be
able to bid away the criminals to the outskirts of the city.
Deﬁnition 3 A residential equilibrium with some crime (regime 2) is a vec-
tor (R2(x),VNC
2 ,VC













at each x ∈ [0,N] (13)
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NC












5Observe that the number of criminals is equal to N.
8Equation (13) says that (absentee) landlords allocate land to the highest
bids in the city. Equations (14)-(15) reﬂect the equilibrium conditions in the




2 =[ 1− p(m,n2,α)][b(n2,α) − αtN] (16)
V
NC
2 = w − tN +( 1− α)tn2 (17)







−tx + tN − (1 − α)tn2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ N − n2
−αtx + αtN for N − n2 <x≤ N
0 for x>N
(18)
In this latter case (regime 2), it is interesting to observe that the land rent
of criminals is not aﬀected by the number of criminals n2 whereas the one of
the workers is negatively aﬀected by n2. This is a widely observed fact that
the higher the number of criminals in an area, the lower the property price.
See, for example, Gibbons (2004). Observe also that both utilities V C
2 and
V NC
2 are aﬀected by n2; n2 positively aﬀects V NC
2 whereas the eﬀect on V C
2 is
ambiguous (see our discussion below). Indeed, if n2 increases, then for a given
N, this implies that the number of workers decreases (because some workers
are becoming criminal) and thus they occupy less land in the central part of
the city. As a result, the competition for land in the central part of the city
is reduced and the land rent for workers decreases. This in turn implies that
their utility level increases.
3.2 Choosing to work or to commit crime
For that, let us study V C
2 and V NC
2 (the general case) with respect to n2.L e t








2 (n2 =0 )=w − tN > 0 (20)
For V C

































2 (n2 =0 )≡ V
C
0 =( 1− p0)(b0 − αtN) > 0 (23)
where p0 ≡ p(m,0,α) > 0 and b0 ≡ b(0,α) > 0. We further denote by p
and b the minimum values of p(m,n,α) and b(n,α) respectively, i.e. p ≡
p(m,N,α) > 0 and b ≡ b(N,α) > 0. Finally, we denote by n∗ the solution of
(21) and by V C∗ the corresponding utility, i.e. V C∗ ≡ V C
2 (n2 = n∗).
Using (21)-(23), it is easy to see that, starting at a positive value V C
0 ,
V C
2 increases up to n∗ where it reaches its maximum, and then decreases (see
for example Figure 1). The intuition of this is quite easy. As stated above
there are two eﬀects. When the number of criminals increases, the probability
to be caught decreases (ﬁrst eﬀect) but the booty is reduced (second eﬀect).
So when the number of criminals is quite low, increasing n2 implies that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one (this is partly due to the assumptions
∂2b(n,α)/∂n2 ≤ 0 and ∂2p(m,n,α)/∂n2 ≥ 0). However, when the number of
criminals is already quite large, i.e. n2 >n ∗, then the second eﬀect dominates
the ﬁrst one.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4 The equilibrium
We are now able to characterize the diﬀerent regimes (Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4










(i) If the wage w is suﬃciently large, i.e. w>t N+ V C∗ or if the wage has
intermediate value, tN + V C
0 <w<t N+ V C∗, and (24) holds, then in
equilibrium there is no crime (regime 1) in the city, ne
1 =0 .A l lw o r k e r s
enjoy the same utility level V NC
1 = w − tN and the land rent in the city
is given by (8).
10(ii) If the wage has intermediate value, tN + V C
0 <w<t N+ V C∗ and (24)
does not hold, or if the wage is quite small, w<t N+ V C
0 , then there is
either some crime or total crime in the city. More precisely,
(iia) If there is some crime (regime 2) in the city, the equilibrium crime
level ne
2 is given by:
w = tN − (1 − α)tn
e




2,α) − αtN] (25)
and this solution is such that n∗ ≤ ne
2 <N. All criminals have a utility
level given by (16) whereas all workers enjoy a utility level equal to (17).
The land rent in the city is given by (18).
(iib) If there is total crime (regime 3) in the city, the equilibrium crime
level is ne
3 = N. All criminals enjoy the same utility level (11) and
the land rent in the city is given by (12).
Proof. See the Appendix.
[Insert Figures 2,3,4 here]
T h ef o l l o w i n gc o m m e n t sa r ei no r d e r . F i r s t ,w eh a v eh e r et h ei n t u i t i v e
result that labor market opportunities play a major role in explaining crime
behaviors. Indeed, if the wage w is large enough, i.e. w>t N+ V C∗ (V C∗
does not depend on w), then there is no crime in this city (Figure 1). On the
contrary, if the wage w is small enough, i.e. w< <t N+ V C
0 (V C
0 does not
depend on w), then everybody has the incentive of becoming a criminal (Figure
2). Second, it is interesting to observe that, because of the competition in the
land market, then even if the wage has intermediate value, we can end up with
either a crime-free equilibrium or a total-crime equilibrium. However, here the
diﬀerent eﬀects are diﬃcult to disentangle and, in order to better understand
them, we perform a comparative-statics analysis for the most realistic case,
that is when some positive amount of crime exists in equilibrium (regime 2).
Proposition 3 Consider only regime 2 in which the equilibrium number of
criminals ne
2 is deﬁned by (25), where n∗ ≤ ne
2 <N. Then to reduce crime, one
must can increase the police resources m,a n d / o rt h ew a g ew in the city, and/or
reduce the commuting cost t. Moreover, bigger cities (i.e. higher population
N) tend to have more crime. Finally, the eﬀect of the number of crime per
criminal on the number of criminals is ambiguous.
11Proof. See the Appendix.
We have ﬁrst some standard results that have already be shown in the crime
literature (see e.g. the survey of Garoupa, 1997). Indeed, not surprisingly,
more police resources and/or more labor market opportunities (i.e. higher
wages) do reduce crime in the city. One of the most interesting results is
however the eﬀect of t on ne
2. For a given crime level n2, when commuting costs
t increase, both the utility of a non-criminal (∂V NC
2 /∂t = −N +(1−α)n2 < 0)
and of a criminal decrease (∂V C
2 /∂t = −(1−p(m,n2,α))αn2 < 0) because land
prices become higher everywhere in the city (competition in the land market
increases since the access to the CBD becomes more costly; see (18)). However,
because the ﬁrst eﬀect is stronger than the second one, i.e.6




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ = N − (1 − α)n2 > (1 − p(m,n2,α))αn2 =




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ (26)
the net eﬀect is positive. In other words, when t increases, the negative eﬀect
on land rents (i.e. the increase in housing prices) is stronger for workers than
for criminals because the former reside close to the CBD for which the access
becomes more costly. As a result, since in terms of utility workers lose relatively
more than criminals (see (26)), it becomes less costly to be a criminal, and, as
a result, the number of criminals ne
2 in the city increases.
This is an interesting and new eﬀect since access to the CBD can play an
important role in explaining criminal behaviors (access to the CBD is impor-
tant for both workers and criminals because the former work there while the
latter commit their crime there). Indeed, a high value of t,w h i c hm e a n st h a t
it is very costly to commute (for example because the transportation system
is very bad), increase crime in the CBD because it becomes relatively more
costly to be a worker than a criminal.
This result is at odds to what has sometimes been advocated in the U.S.
I n d e e d ,s o m ep e o p l eb e l i e v et h a tap o l i c yt h a tm a k e sd i ﬃcult the access to
certain areas (like for example to refuse to build a new transportation system
that links black inner cities to white rich suburbs) will reduce the crime level in
these areas (the suburbs). Our model says that this type of policy7 will in fact
have some impact on the housing market by increasing the price in the rich area
and, as a result, can induce some individuals to become criminal. However,
6See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
7Observe that our model can also address the fact that “the heart” of the city is in the
suburbs. It suﬃces to ﬂip our city over so that the CBD becomes the Suburban Business
District.
12this results strongly depends on our assumption that crime is localized in the
CBD (or here the Suburban Business District). If, on the contrary, individuals
could also commit their crime where they live, then increasing commuting cost
by making the access to the SBD more diﬃcult, will certainly reduce the crime
in the suburbs but increase it in inner cities.
L e tu sn o ws t u d yt h ee ﬀect of α, the number of crime per criminal, on
ne
2. For a given crime level n2,w h e nα increases, the utility of a non-criminal
decreases (∂V NC















b e c a u s ei ti sm o r ec o s t l yt oc o m m i tc r i m e( i . e . m o r ec o m m u t i n g )a n dt h e
probability to be caught is higher but the booty is greater. Consequently, the
net eﬀect is ambiguous.
Finally, when N the size of the city and thus of the population increases,
the price of land increases everywhere in the city (see (18)), but the increase is
higher for a worker (∂R2/∂N = t>0) than for a criminal (∂R2/∂N = αt > 0).
As a result, the relative utility of being criminal is higher so that more people
become criminal.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper focuses on the role of commuting costs, location and housing prices
in crime behaviors in cities. Jobs and crime are localized since all crimes are
assumed to be committed in the Central Business District (CBD) where all
jobs are located. Therefore, the decision to commit crime depends on the
commuting cost, the housing price, but also on the number of criminals in
the city (more criminals implies that the return per criminal is smaller but
that the probability to be caught is lower). We ﬁrst characterize the diﬀerent
equilibria. Not surprisingly, we found that if the wage is large enough, then
there is no crime in this city whereas if it is small enough, then everybody has
the incentive of becoming a criminal. However, for intermediate values of the
wage, there is some positive level of crime in the city and the criminals live
far away from jobs while the workers reside close to the CBD. We then focus
on this last regime and we show that in bigger cities there is more crime and
increasing police resources reduces crime. We also show that, when the access
to the CBD becomes more diﬃcult, i.e. the commuting cost increases, housing
13prices rise but this increase is even more pronounced for workers than for
criminals because the former live closer to jobs than the latter. Consequently,
since workers lose relatively more than criminals, an increase in commuting
costs implies that it becomes less costly to be a criminal, and, as a result, the
number of criminals in the city increases.
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15Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
There are three possible regimes in this economy. Either: (i) regime 1:
there is no crime at all, or (iia) regime 2: there a positive amount of crime,
or (iib) regime 3: there is total crime (everybody is a criminal). We want
to characterize these three regimes and the resulting equilibria by varying the
wage w.




1 (n1 =0 )=w − tN > V
C∗
where V C∗ is the highest utility a criminal can reach and w−tN is the utility
of workers when there is no criminal. In this case, it should be clear that there
will be no crime in the city (regime 1) since w−tN > V C∗ guarantees that no





1 denotes the equilibrium value of criminals in regime 1. Observe that
does not depend on w so that if w is suﬃciently large, then there is no crime
in the city.
2. V C
0 <w− tN < V C∗. Then, ﬁve cases can arise. Either (a) the V NC
line and the V C curve doe not intersect at all, or (b) they intersect once but
the corresponding n is less than n∗,o r(c) they intersect twice, and the two
corresponding n are less than n∗,o r(d) they intersect twice, one n is less than
n∗ and one is greater than n∗ but less than N,o r(e) they intersect twice, one
n is less than n∗ and one is greater than N (and thus greater than n∗).
Observe that, any intersection that leads to an n that is less than n∗ is
not an equilibrium (like e.g. point A in Figure 4). Indeed, if n<n ∗,t h e n
this intersection point is located in the upward sloping part of the V C curve,
i.e. where the return to crime is increasing in the number of criminals. Con-
sequently, a worker could make himself better oﬀ b yt u r n i n gt oc r i m i n a la n d
thus the number of criminals should increase. So we can eliminate cases (b)
and (c) since they are not equilibria.
Case (a). To obtain case (a), it must be that the slope of the V NC line at
zero is higher than the slope of the V C curve at zero, i.e. (24).
16In this case, there is no crime in the city (regime 1) since working yields





For the two next cases, it must be that (24) does not hold.
Case (d). The only equilibrium is when the intersection occurs for n∗ ≤
n<N . There is thus a positive amount of crime in equilibrium (regime 2).
To have a positive level of crime, it must be that:
V
C
2 (n = n2)=V
NC
2 (n = n2)
where V C and V NC are given by (16) and (17). This equation says that the last
individual to commit crime will be exactly indiﬀerent between being criminal
a n dn o n - c r i m i n a l .T h es o l u t i o no ft h i se q u a t i o ni sg i v e nb y :
w − tN +( 1− α)tn
e






2 denotes the equilibrium value of criminals in regime 2. We know that
t h e r ei sau n i q u es o l u t i o ni nne
2 to this equation (see e.g. Figure 2). We have
to impose that the solution ne





Case (e). The only equilibrium is when the intersection occurs for n ≥ N.
In this case, obviously, everybody chooses to be a criminal (regime 3) since the




3. w − tN < V C
0 . There can only be one intersection between the V NC
line and the V C curve. Three cases may arise. Either (a) the intersection
occurs for n<n ∗,o r(b) the intersection occurs for n∗ ≤ n<N ,o r(c) the
intersection occurs for n ≥ N.
As above, we can eliminate case (a) s i n c et h i si sn o ta ne q u i l i b r i u m .
Case (b). This is exactly like case 2.(d) above (regime 2). The number of
criminal ne
2 is thus given by:
w − tN +( 1− α)tn
e














Proposition 2 summarizes these results by focusing on the three regimes.
Proof of Proposition 3












































As a result D<0.N o ws i n c e∂p(m,ne


















N − (1 − α)ne






2 −[1 − p(m,n
e





18It is easy to see that
N [1 − (1 − p(m,n
e
2,α)α)] > (1 − α)n
e
2






1 − (1 − p(m,ne
2,α))α
which is always true. Indeed, we know that N>n e
2, which implies that
N/ne
2 > 1 and 1−α<1−(1 − p(m,ne
2,α))α is equivalent to 1−p(m,ne
2,α) < 1,
































which cannot be signed.









since [1 − p(m,ne
2,α)]α<1.
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